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Towards a More Perfect European Human
Rights Standard: A New Argument Against
a United Kingdom Bill of Rights
For the American concerned with European developments
in human rights, perhaps no better time exists than the present to consider that community's movement towards a bill of
rights.' Among the diplomatic and academic struggles which
have attended Europe's most recent post-war forays into bill-ofrights thinking2 has been the United Kingdom's reluctance to
either sign or fully embrace certain European human rights
instruments.' This reluctance is rooted in domestic soil. While
politicians and professors have debated the merits of a bill of
rights: the United Kingdom has failed to adopt such a

1. 1991 was recently celebrated as the two-hundredth anniversary of the United States Bill of Rights. Now in its 202nd year, our Bill of Rights is celebrated as
a precious document whose protections are an American citizen's greatest entitlement. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 166 (1968) (Black, J., concurring) ("What
more precious 'privilege' of American citizenship could there be than that privilege
to claim the protections of our great Bill of Rights?"). For thoughtful discussions of
the Bill of Rights and that document's impact upon American culture, law, and
BILL OF RIGHTS(1958); BERNARD
S C H W m , THE
politics, see LEARNEDHAND,
BILL OF RIGHTS:A DOCUMENTARY
H I ~ R (1971).
Y
2. .A concerted international movement to both enumerate and protect fundamental human rights developed in the years following World War 11 and subsequent revelations regarding Nazi war crimes. See JA. Andrews, The European
Jurisprudence of Human Rights, 43 MD. L. REV. 463, 474-75 (1984); Roger Myers,
A New Remedy for Northern Ireland: The Case for United Nations Peacekeeping
Intervention in an Internal Conflict, 11 N.Y.L. ScH. J. INTI & COMP.L. 3, 83
n.432, 84 n.439 (1990); see also Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
A) at 117 (1978) (Fitzmaurice, J., separate opinion) (recognizing that the European
Convention was drafted in response to the horrors of World War In.
3. See infia text accompanying notes 18-25.
4.
For a detailed discussion of the recent history of the bill of rights debate
within the United Kingdom, see MICHAELZANDER,A BILL OF RIGHTS? 1-26 (3d ed.,
Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1985). Concerning this debate, one commentator has dryly
observed that "[a]lthough the debate on 'A Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom'
staggers on, with an occasional flurry of interest giving it new life, the prospects
for such legislation do seem remote. Parliamentary and governmental interest . . .
have since 1979 lain elsewhere." B.H., Book Note, 37 N. IR. LEGALQ. 209, 210
(1986) (reviewing ZANDEF~,supra). Both scholarship and polemics mark this debate.
See generally DO WE NEED A BILL OF RIGHTS? (Colin M. Campbell ed., 1980);
Jos~wJACONELLI,ENACTINGA BIU OF RIGHTS: THE LEGAL PROBLEMS
(1980)
(containing arguments for and against a bill of rights) [hereinatbr JACONELLI
I];
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This failure constitutes perhaps the primary obstacle to
the United Kingdom's participation in European efforts towards a unified outlook on human rights.
To the extent the United Kingdom's national doings influence its actions abroad, an analysis of the United Kingdom's
position regarding a European bill of rights necessarily implicates an analysis of its view regarding similar domestic legislation. However, the more consequential-and far more overlooked-analysis concerns how European Convention6processes for ensuring personal liberties influence the manner in
which the United Kingdom pursues its domestic human rights
agenda. In developing this latter analysis, this comment argues
that the United Kingdom should maintain its position against a
domestic bill of rights in order t o better facilitate the development of case law under the European Convention and, hence,
aid the generation of a more comprehensive, uniform European
standard of human rights.
Section I1 of this comment provides a brief background
discussion of the United Kingdom's position on human rights.
Section I11 analyzes how the current United Kingdom position
affects and enhances the creation of a clear human rights jurisprudence applicable on a continent-wide basis through the
mechanisms of the European Convention. Section TV discusses
the future of a European Community bill of rights and the
United Kingdom's contribution to that future. In conclusion,
this comment proposes that the United Kingdom not adopt a
bill of human rights. Refusing to do so will, in the long run,
become a substantial factor in unifylng European perspectives
on human rights through aligning the United Kingdom with its
European counterparts and facilitating the European Convention process for administering and defining a European human
rights standard.

and Joseph Jaconelli, The European Convention on Human Rights-The Tent of a
British Bill of Rights?, 1976 PUB.L. 226 (same) [hereinafter Jaconelli 111.
5. Recent proposals made within the United Kingdom for an entrenched, domestic bill of rights have met objections similar to those made during the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates against the inclusion of a bill of rights
within the U.S. Constitution. For a detailed treatment of such objections to a U.K.
bill of rights, see ZANDER, supra note 4, at 27-82. Compare THE FEDERALISTNO.
84 (Alexander Hamilton); HERBERT J. STORING, WHATTHE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE
FOR (Murray Dry ed., 1981).
6. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention].

'
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The United Kingdom's approach t o international human
rights-careful assessment, reservation, and hesitation to overenumerate fundamental rights-is consistent with its rejection
of a national bill of rights. Having a t length considered such a
bill,' the United Kingdom has continued its traditional creation of constitutional rights through the common law and
specific legislation rather than through a general proclamation.'
In 1950, the United Kingdom signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.' This document differs from the earlier Universal Declaration of Human
Rights,'' which the United Kingdom also signed, in two important respects. First, the Universal Declaration sought only
to proclaim or recognize fundamental rights rather than bind
signatory states," but the European Convention clearly seeks

See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
7.
8. For a discussion of how constitutional rights are created within the United
Kingdom, see 2 WILLIAM
HOLDSWORTH,
A H I ~ R OF
Y ENGLISHLAW406-597 (4th
LEGALSYSTEMS CYCLOPEDIA3.230.10-12, .15-24, at $5 1.3(A),
ed. 1936); 3 MODERN
1.4 (Kenneth R. Redden ed., 1990).
9. See European Convention, supra note 6.
10. The European Convention was preceded two years earlier by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, which was adopted without dissent by the United
Nations General Assembly. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217A
(1111, U N Doc. N810, at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
11. As the Preamble to the Universal Declaration states:
The Geneml Assembly
Proclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a common
standard for achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that
every individual and every organ of society, . . . shall strive . . . to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures,
national and i n t e m t w d . to secure their universal and effective reconnitioh and observance, both 'among the peoples of the Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
Universal Declaration, supra note 10, at 71 (third and fourth emphases added). But
see Myers, supra note 2, at 86-87 ("[A]lthough the [Universal] Declaration was
originally non-binding on member states, it has assumed the status of mandatory
customary i n t e n a t w d law, having been re-ed
without opposition countless
times within the United Nations,, incorporated into several national constitutions,
and in practice invoked as if legally binding.") (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
Myers suggests that his view gained wide acceptance by the 1960s. Id. Others
share a more guarded view of the Universal Declaration's international legal force.
See, eg., JACONELLI
I , supra note 4, at 247 (Universal Declaration "not conceived
as imposing legal obligations and has, at most, the charader of customary international law").
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to legally bind its signatories.12 Second, the European Convention provides a mechanism to secure compliance with its provisions. This enforcement mechanism takes the form of two judicial bodies, the European Commission of Human Rights1' and
the European Court of Human Rights.14
In 1961, the Council of Europe15 introduced the European
Social Charter,16 an international instrument intended to secure social and economic rights." The United Kingdom led the
opposition to the European Social Charter, which was eventually ratified in 1965." One year later, the United Nations
opened for signature two additional human rights documents:
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightslg and
Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights states the follow12.
ing: "The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention." European
Convention, supra note 6, art. 1.
13. See infra part IIIA.1.
14. See infra part IIIA.2.
15.
The Council of Europe is an international human rights body based in
Strasbourg, France. Its 23 member states are also signatory states, or "High Contracting Parties," to the European Convention, the Council of Europe's premier
human rights document. In addition to the United Kingdom, the Council's member
states include Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of
Germany, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta,
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and
OF EUROPE,
EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
ON HUMAN
RIGHTS:COLLECTTurkey. COUNCIL
ED TEXTS 68 (1987). As of spring, 1990, several Eastern European states were
applying to become parties to the European Convention as a precondition to membership in the Council of Europe. Stephan Breitenmoser & Gunter E. Wilms, Human Rights v. Extradition: The Soering Case, 11 MICH. J. I m L. 845, 845 n.2
(1990).
16.
European Social Charter, opened for sigmture Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S.
89 (entered into force Feb. 26, 1965).
INTERNATIONAL
HUMANRIGHTS
17.
See FRANR NEWMAN& DAVIDWEISSBRODT,
463 (1990). The European Social Charter also includes an implementation procedure which requires signatory states to report on domestic application of the
Charteis provisions. Id.
18. See Mary F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European
Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FORDHAM
INTL
' L J . 639, 646
11.25 (1990-91). For discussions of the history and import of the European Charter,
see COUNCILOF EUROPE,THE EUROPEAN
SOCIALCHARTER:ORIGINS,OPERATION,
RESULTS (1981); DAVIDHARRIS, THE EUROPEAN
SOCIAL CHARTER
(1984). See also
Dominick, supra, at 658-67 (comparing European Community's European Social
Charter with the Commission of European Communities' Community Charter);
Mark Gould, The European Social Charter and Community Law-A Comment, 14
EUR. L. REV.223 (1989) (arguing that the Charter has very limited significance as
a source of Community law when compared to other documents in a "hierarchie
des sources" for such law); Alan J. Riley, The European Social Charter and Communib Law, 14 EUR. L. REV. 80 (1989) (arguing that the Charter is a significant
part of Community law).
19.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
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the International Covenant on Economic and Social right^.^'
Like the European Convention, both Covenants placed legal
obligations upon ratifying states t o honor the rights enumerated therein21 However, like its approach to the European Social Charter, the United Kingdom stalled its acceptance of
these rights-creating instruments, ratifying them only shortly
before they entered into force in 1976.22
In 1989, the United Kingdom proffered the sole dissent to
the European Council's adoption of the Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights of worker^.^^ Unlike the European
Convention, which protects primarily civil and political rights,
the Community Charter's thirty articles enumerate ten fundamental social and economic rights of both workers and citiz e n ~ Originally
.~~
submitted to the Council of Ministers of the
European Communities by the Commission of the European
Communities, the Community Charter has been characterized
as the Commission's "second major step in ten years toward a
[European] Community bill of rights."25 Rather than adopt
such a measure, the United Kingdom has preferred to take a
lone diplomatic position among its European peers, resisting
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16,
20.
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
21. Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides: "Each [Contracting State] . . . undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized
in the present Covenant . . . ." International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, supm note 19, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. at 173. This Covenant sets forth an
unqualified duty to "ensure" Covenant rights. In contrast, the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights is more tentative, requiring only that states
work towards greater rights in those areas. Article 2(1) of the Covenant states the
following: "Each [Contracting State] undertakes to take steps, individually and
through international assistance and co-operation . . . to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the
rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures." International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra note 20, art. 2(1), 993 U.N.T.S. at 5.
22.
See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See Dominick, supra note 18, at 640 n.2. The European Council is the Eu23.
ropean Community's ruling body. Based in Brussels, Belgium, the European Community is a union of the following twelve member states: Belgium, Denmark,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. Each of the European Community member states belong to the larger Council of Europe, which includes 23
member states. See supra note 15.
24.
See COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEANCOMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEANFILE:
COMMUNITY
CHARTER
OF FUNDAMENTAL
SOCIAL RIGHTS FOR WORKERS(May 1990).
See Dominick, supra note 18, at 639.
25.
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further efforts to generally define and enforce a binding European catalogue of fundamental rights, especially social and
economic rights.
The United Kingdom's refusal to adopt a domestic bill of
rights,26coupled with its expressed resistance to similar international documents, creates the temptation to view the United
Kingdom as antagonistic to human rights. However, such a
view is unwarranted. Ratification of the European Convention
demonstrates a commitment to a substantive human rights
program. An inquiry centering on the European Convention as
a rights-creating mechanism will more ably explain that commitment. This is true because out of all the international instruments signed by the United Kingdom, the European Convention has exercised-and continues to exercise-the
most
substantial influence upon that nation's human rights policy
and jurisprudence. As the following section argues, when that
influence is measured against the United Kingdom's current
position against a domestic bill of rights, the need for a domestic bill becomes subordinate to the greater need to develop
European Convention law which will further increase the
Convention's nonnative influence upon the United Kingdom.
111. THE UNITEDKINGDOMAND THE EUROPEAN
THE CREATIONOF HUMANRIGHTS
CONVENTION:
JURISPRUDENCE

A. European Convention Adjudicative Provisions
The European Convention created a sophisticated mechanism for enforcing human rights.27 Two judicial tribunals

26.
The United Kingdom's present failure to ensure its populace fundamental
rights through the medium of a bill of rights has produced two results. First, no
comprehensive statement of rights, and thus no equally comprehensive catalogue of
remedies, exists for those who would seek to enforce human rights in the United
Kingdom courts. Second, although the United Kingdom has, by virtue of the European Convention, agreed to secure certain rights to those within in its borders, see
supm note 12 and accompanying text, no judicial machinery now exists to enforce
many of those rights in domestic courts. Those seeking to enforce Convention
rights must engage European Convention processes and . thus adjudicate their
claims in Strasbourg, France, the seat of the adjudicative machinery currently in
effect under the European Convention. See i n h part IIIA.
27.
One commentator has noted that "the judicial machinery established pursuant to the European Convention on Human Rights is considered the most advanced
and effective system for the protection of human rights in the world." John P.
Groarke, Comment, Reuolutionaries Beware: The E,msion of the Po2itica2 Offense
Exception Under the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition

EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS
exercise adjudicative authority under the convention: the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights.28
1. European Commission of Human Rights

The European Commission of Human Rights is a twentythree member panel with a representative from each signatory
or individual who has
, ~ state
~
to the European C o n ~ e n t i o nA
suffered a human rights violation may petition the European
Commission for redress of a signatory state's violation of the
European Conventi~n;~provided that the party first exhausts
all remedies within its national legal system.31 After investigating a complaint's factual allegati0ns,3~the Commission attempts to arrange a settlement between the parties.33 If this
attempt fails, the Commission makes a preliminary determination on the merits of the complaint in the form of a report stating whether the defendant state has violated the European
C ~ n v e n t i o n .Within
~~
three months of the report, either the
Commission or any of the named state parties may bring the
case before the European Court of Human Rights.35 In cases

Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1515, 1544 (1988).
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234.
28.
29. Id. art. 20. For a detailed explanation of how the European Commission of
Human Rights operates, see J.E.S. FAWCETT,
THE APPLICATION
OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION
ON HUMANRIGHTS (2d ed. 1987); P. VAN DLJK& G.J.H. VAN HOOF,
CONVENTION
ON HUMANRIGHTS (2d ed.
THEORYAND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
1990).
30. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. a t 236. See Rosalyn Higgins, The European Convention on Human Rights, in 2 HUMANRIGHTSIN
INTERNATIONAL
LAW:LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES495, 505-06 (T. Meron ed., 1984).
31. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 213 UN.T.S. at 238. Exhaustion of legal remedies is a chief requirement for claims brought under the European Convention.
32.
The Commission's factual determination is accompanied by a written opinion
issued to each party, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, and the
Secretary-General of the Council of Europe. The opinion is also published. See
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 30, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240.
33. Id. art. 28, 213 U.N.T.S. a t 238-40; see Higgins, supra note 30, a t 506; see
also European Convention, supra note 6, art. 47, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246 (The Court
"may only deal with a case after the Commission has acknowledged the failure of
efforts for a friendly settlement.").
34. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 31, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240; see
Higgins, supm note 30, a t 506-07.
35. European Convention, supm note 6, arts. 32, 44, 47, & 48, 213 U.N.T.S. a t
240-42, 246; see Higgins, supra note 30, at 507. The European Convention contains
no provision allowing individual petitioners themselves to bring cases before the
European Court of Human Rights. Although an individual may initiate Convention
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where no such action is taken, the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe decides whether the European Convention has been violated.36Signatory states "undertake to regard
as binding" decisions reached by the Committee of minister^.^^

2. European Court of Human Rights
Like the Commission, the European Court of Human
Rights3' is comprised of twenty-three elected judges, one from
'
a case is
each member state of the Council of E u r ~ p e . ~When
properly presented to the Court, seven members, who comprise
a chamber, hear the case.40Any decision reached thereafter is
final4' and binding upon member states.42 Following a judgment by the Court, the Committee of Ministers supervises its
execution.43
The European Convention empowers the Court to hear
cases raising questions of interpretation regarding Convention
p r o ~ i s i o n s .As
~ ~will be discussed, this interpretive role provides the foundation upon which a singular corpus-and perhaps theory-of European human rights law can begin to be
built.

judicial processes by bringing a petition before the European Commission of Human Rights, only the Commission or a state named in the petition has power to
bring the case before the Court. Presumably the Commission protects individual
claimants' interests through its power to refer cases to the Court if a named state
party refuses to do so.
36.
European Convention, supm note 6, art. 32, 213 U.N.T.S. at 240. Any
violation must be found by a two-thirds majority of the Committee.
37.
Id. art. 32(4).
38.
For a detailed analysis of the duties and functions of the European Court
of Human Rights, see sources cited supra note 29.
39.
European Convention, supra note 6, arts. 38, 39, 213 U.N.T.S. at 242-44;
see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
40.
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 43, 213 U.N.T.S. at 244.
41.
Id. art. 52, 213 U.N.T.S. at 248.
42.
Id. art. 53 (Member states "undertake to abide by the decision of the Court
in any case to which they are parties.").
43.
Id. art. 54.
44.
Article 45 of the European Convention provides: "The jurisdiction of the
Court shall extend to all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the
present Convention which the High Contracting Parties or the Commission shall
refer to it in accordance with Article 48." Id. art. 45, 213 U.N.T.S. at 246 (emphasis added).
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B. The Interpretive Role of the European Court
of Human Rights: Creating a New European
Jurisprudence of Human Rights
The non-binding character of the Universal Declaration
and the two European Covenants allowed each state to determine for itself how to achieve the human rights aspirations of
these documents.45Although such freedom also exists under
the European Convention, i t is more limited. Because the Convention provides an enforcement mechanism, it binds signatories not merely with aspirational pronouncements, but also
with case law. Thus, the European Convention has been characterized as "a law-making treaty the object of which is to
oblige the parties to apply certain rules of international law
and, if necessary, to add or modifi their national law for this
purpose."46As a result, the European Convention assumes a
sui generis character.47 That is, as a law-making force, the
Convention transcends the "traditional boundaries between
international and domestic law,'"'' thereby establishing "a new
legal order designed to substitute for the particular systems of
individual states a common European order."49 Thus, signatory states are subject to a common law supreme to their own national law within the sphere of human rights. As the final5'
arbiter of states' duties under the European Convention, the
European Court of Human Rights assumes the ultimate role of

45.
See ANDREW Z. DRZEMCZEWSKI,
EUROPEAN
HUMANRIGHTS CONVENTION
IN
DOMESTICLAW: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY 21-22 (1983):
[Allthough the duty to bring domestic law into line with international
contractual obligations certainly exists, international law is silent with
regard to the means by which this object is to be achieved. Such conformity is a matter of domestic concern, normally determined by constitutional provisions and practice of each state.
46.
Arnold D. McNair, The European Convention of 1950 for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, in TIIE EXPANSION
OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 9, 27 (81st Lionel Cohen Lecture, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1962)
(emphases added).
47.
DR~EMCZE~SKI,
supra note 45, at 23 (citing A.H. ROBERTSON,HUMAN
RIGHTSIN EUROPE231 (1977)).
48.
Andrews, supra note 2, at 466.
HUMAN
DRZEMCZEWSKI,
supra note 45, at 23 (citing A.H. ROBERTSON,
49.
RIGHTSIN EUROPE231 (1977)).
50.
The European Commission of Human Rights is considered the chief arbiter
of whether state action violates the Convention. See supra part IIIA.1. However,
ultimate questions of interpretation are left strictly within the province of the
Court.
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defining normative standards among member states for those
classes of rights enumerated in the European C ~ n v e n t i o n . ~ ~
Thus, initially it appears that the Court is uniquely poised
to shape, if not ultimately determine, the path of human rights
law among the European Convention's member states.52 Even
among nonmember nations, the Court's decisions can be expected to influence developing attitudes towards human rights.
Of course, for the Court to play such a vital role in the
evolution of European human rights law, its decisions must be
legally compelling. Signatory states regularly accept and abide
by decisions reached through European adjudicative processes.
In numerous cases, decisions by either the Commission or the
Court have prompted remedial action by the defendant state,
often amidst significant political pressure to act otherwise, and
sometimes even before the Court announces its decision. Three
such instances involving the United Kingdom will be considered in the following pages.
1. The Golder Case

In the Golder Case5sthe Court held that certain British
prison regulations violated the European Convention. The series of regulations under review in Golder allowed prison authorities t o control communications between prisoners and
outside legal counsel. The applicant, Mr. Sidney Golder, was an
inmate accused of being involved in an altercation that injured
a prison guard.54 Some time later, Golder attempted to write
both a representative in Parliament and a Chief C ~ n s t a b l e . ~ ~
However, pursuant to the Prison Rules then in force, the prison
governor prevented Golder from doing so.56 Additionally,

51.
Certain classes of rights, primarily economic, are not protected by the European Convention. Cf.Universal Declaration, supra note 10, arts. 22-25, at 83
(proclaiming economic rights).
52.
See infra part III.C.2.
53.
18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1975). The Golder Case was the first individual
application from the United Kingdom to reach the European Court of Human
Rights.
54.
18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-9.
55.
Id. at 8.
56.
Regarding the Prison Rules, the Court made the following finding:
In England the matter of contacts of convicted prisoners with persons
outside their place of detention is governed by the Prison Act 1952, as
amended, and subordinate legislation made under that Act.
Section 47, sub-section I, of the Prison Act provides that "the Secretary of State [Home Secretary] may make rules for the regulation and
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Britain's Home Secretary denied Golder permission to consult
an attorney.57In response, Golder submitted to the Commission a complaint alleging violations of European Convention
Articles 6(1)58and 8.59
Upon review, the Commission reported that the Prison
Rules improperly denied Mr. Golder the rights of access to the
courts and to legal counsel.60Building upon the Commission's
report, the Court interpreted the Articles in question to confer
these rights on prisoners, and found that the restrictions violated Golder's rights.61 In response to the Court's holding, the
British government promptly removed the offending regulations
and substituted new regulations in their place.62
2. Ireland v. United Kingdom

Ireland v. United Kingdom63provides a second example of
how European Convention judicial processes have prompted
remedial action. In this case both the European Commission
and the Court of Human Rights considered Ireland's claims
that the United Kingdom had subjected Irish citizens t o "inhumanagement of prisoners . . . and for the . . . treatment . . . discipline
and control of persons required to be detained . . . ."
The rules made by the Home Secretary in the exercise of this power
are the Prison Rules 1964, which were laid before Parliament and have
the status of [statutory law].
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). Rules 33(2) and 34(8) prohibited inmates from communicating with "any outside person" unless granted leave by the Home Secretary. Id.
at 10.
Id.
57.
"In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal
58.
charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."
European Convention, supm note 6, art. 6(1), 213 U.N.T.S. 228; see 18 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) at 13 e[T]he 'right' which Golder wished, rightly or wrongly, to invoke against [the guard who identified him] was a 'civil right' within the meaning
of Article 6 Q 1.").
59.
Article 8 provides: "(1) Everyone has the right to respect for his . . . correspondence. (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right e x ~ p such
t
as is in accordance with law and is necessary . . .
[to] national security, public safety [or certain other enumerated state interests]."
European Convention, supra note 6, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. at 230.
60.
18 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20.
Id.
61.
62. RICHARD
B. LILUCH & FRANKC. NEWMAN,INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 583 (1979). But see Eric Leigh, Prison Rules Negate
Spirit of Court Ruling', THE TIMES (London), Aug. 21, 1975, at 2, cited in LILLICH
& NEWMAN, supra, at 585.
63.
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1978).
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man o r degrading treatment" in violation of Article 3 of the
~ ~ Irish government alleged that
European C ~ n v e n t i o n .The
United Kingdom Security Forces subjected suspected members
of the Irish Republican Army to a series of degrading interrogation techniques.65 The British government claimed the techniques were warranted given the existence of a public emergency in Northern Ireland at the time of i n t e r r ~ g a t i o n .In
~~
fact, both the Commission and the Court found a state of emerbut they still condemned the technique^.^'
gency
Ireland brought its complaint against the United Kingdom
in 1971.69 In December 1975, after the Commission commenced fact-finding and earnest consideration of the matter,
but before it rendered an opinion, the British government
abandoned its use of the offending interrogation technique^.^'
At least one commentator has suggested the United Kingdom
acted remedially, anticipating adverse findings by the Europea n Comrni~sion.~~
Moreover, following the Commission's published findings in 1976, Ireland secured from the British government a n unconditional declaration that such interrogation
techniques would never be used again.72 The unqualified
nature of such an act speaks well of the Commission's influence
on a politically significant decision.

3. The Soering Case
Perhaps the most significant recent case illustrating the
normative force of the Court of Human Rights is the Soering

64. Id. a t 60-72.Article 3 of the European Convention provides that "[lo one
shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." European Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
65. These techniques included forcing suspects to stand for an extended time
against a wall while resting their weight on their fingers and toes, covering their
heads with black hoods, subjecting them to a high-volume hissing noise, and depriving them of adequate sleep, food, and water. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41.
66. Id. a t 77-78.See European Convention, supra note 6, art. 15, 213 U.N.T.S.
at 232-34 (State derogation from European Convention is permitted in some instances of "public emergency," but only "to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.").
67. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 78.
68. Id a t 94-95;Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5310171, 28
Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 278, 285 (1978).
69. See LILLICH& NEWMAN,
supm note 62, at 589.
70. 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 82.
71. See Higgins, supra note 30, at 509.
72. See Britain on the Dock, ECONOMIS~,
Apr. 30, 1977, at 14, cited in LILLICH
& NEWMAN,
supra note 62, at 615-16.
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Case.73In Soering, the Court considered whether the extradition of a capital murder suspect from the United Kingdom to
Virginia would violate European Convention proscriptions
against "torture"74 or "inhuman or degrading treatment or
p ~ n i s h m e n t , "given
~ ~ conditions existing for death row prisoners in the United States.I6
Soering was a German national attending college in Virginia. When his girlfriend's parents were murdered in March
1985, Soering and his girlfriend fled Virginia.77In April 1986,
Following Soering's arrest,
Soering was arrested in E~~gland.~'
the United States government requested extradition pursuant
to an existing extradition treaty." Soering began judicial proceedings under the European Convention to block extradition,
alleging that his extradition to the United States would violate
Article 3 of the European Con~ention.'~Virginia was seeking
the death penalty ,which might subject him to adverse conditions on Virginia's death row.''
The Court first determined that exposure to the "death row
phenomenon" would violate Article 3.82 The Court then held
that Article 3 imposes a duty upon contracting states t o refuse
extradition in cases that present a substantial risk of an Article
3 vi~lation.'~In response t o the Court's ruling, the United

73. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
74. European Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224.
75. Id.
76. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26-28.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 12. See Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, U.S.-U.K.-N.Ir., 28 U.S.T.
227, 229, 1049 U.N.T.S. 167, 169 (specifying that Contracting Parties agree to
extradite "any personn accused or convicted of specific offenses "committed within
the jurisdiction of the other Party").
80. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 15.
81. Id. at 30-31.The Court considered evidence provided by Mr. Soering regarding the "death row phenomenon," including "evidence of extreme stress, psychological deterioration and risk of homosexual abuse and physical attack undergone by
prisoners on death row." Id. at 25, 27.
82. Id. at 44-45.
83. The Court stated:
Extradition in such circumstances . . . would plainly be contrary to the
spirit and intendment of [Article 31, and in the Court's view this inherent
obligation not to extradite also extends to cases in which the fugitive
would be faced in the receiving State by a real risk of exposure to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment proscribed by that Article.
Id. at 35.
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Kingdom refused to extradite Soering to the United States
until the capital murder charges against him were dropped.84
Each of the preceding decisions-Golder, Ireland v. United
Kingdom, and Soering4emonstrates the extent to which the
European Convention's binding authority is recognized within
the United Kingd~m.'~Each case also demonstrates the degree to which judicial processes set forth under the Convention
constitute an effective mechanism t o protect human rights.86
Finally, these cases suggest the dynamic potential of the
Court's power to interpret the Convention. The Court is
uniquely positioned to create charismatic, forward-moving
human rights case law for its member nations. The deference
which the United Kingdom accords the Court's decisions suggests its willingness to view the Convention machinery as properly creating a European "common law" of human rights. Such
a process corresponds to, and complements, the United
Kingdom's traditional rights-creating mechanisms.

84.
Soering remained in British custody until his extradition to the United
States in January 1990, after American authorities removed the death penalty
charges then pending against him. Regina C. D o ~ e u y ,Comment, Soering v. United Kingdom: Whethw the Continued Use of the Death Penalty in the United States
Contradicts International Thinking?, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CW. CONFINEMENT 340 n.6 (1990); see NEWMAN
& WEISSBRODT,
supm note 17, at 477 n.6.
85.
Another example is the Sunday Times Case, 30 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1979). Sunday Times involved one of the most politically charged rights-freedom
of expression. The Sunday Times began publishing a series of articles about the
deformative effects of thalidomide upon children. However, the United Kingdom's
highest judicial authority, the House of Lords, enjoined the Times from publishing
further articles, reasoning that to do otherwise would cause the public to form
biases about certain issues surrounding then-pending civil negligence litigation
against the drug's manufacturer, and thus constitute contempt. Id. at 20. Ultimately, the case was laid before the European Court of Human Rights, which ruled
that the House of Lords' injunction breached the paper's right to free expression
under Article 10 of the Convention. Id. at 45. In response-and amidst a great
deal of political tumultParliament enacted legislation effectively overruling the
House of Lords' decision. Contempt of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49, 9 5; see MARK W.
JANE& RICHARDS. KAY,EUROPEAN
HUMANRIGHTSLAW96-116 (1990) (discussing
Sunday Times and the Court's influence upon U.K. law); Anthony Lester, The
Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM.L. REV. 537, 552-54
(1988) (same).
86. See also DRZEMCZEWSKI,
supm note 45, at 186-87 (citing cases brought
under the European Convention involving. the United Kingdom and which have
resulted in substantive changes in both United Kingdom law and social policy);
Tyrer Case, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 8-10 (1978) (In response to a Commission
report, the Isle of Mann amended its law to lessen the degree of corporal punishment administered.); Reed v. United Kingdom, App No. 7245132, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep.
136 (1979) (agreement to alter regulations concerning prisoners' rights to complain
of prison treatment) (friendly settlement).
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C. Domestic Human Rights Aims in the European Context
The previous analysis illustrates the European
Convention's substantive capacity to enforce its provisions
within the United Kingdom. One response to the exercise of
that capacity emphasizes the negative international public
relations aspect of adverse Court rulings. For example, in an
oblique 1985 reference t o judgments such as Ireland v. United
Kingdom and Golder, Lord Scarman of the House of Lords
referred to these types of decisions as "embarrassments" t o the
United Kingdom among the international and European comm~nities.~'
Insofar as these decisions considered United Kingdom law as having failed at various points to secure rights set
forth in the European Convention, Lord Scarman called for
"urgent remedial action7' granting the Convention the force of
statute within the United Kingdom.88
Lord Scarman's concern is focused primarily on political
opinion. This concern, although important, is misplaced given
the instant context. On balance, the positive aspects of the
Court's decisions outweigh any potentially negative public relations effects. Indeed, in Soering, the Court was careful to emphasize the United Kingdom's good faith and propriety in seeking review of the case.89Clearly, such qualities hardly present
occasion for embarrassment. Rather, as the following analysis
suggests, the positive results emanating from the United
Kingdom's particular status-that of not possessing an entrenched bill of rights-arguably work to advance the specific
aims set forth in the European Convention.

87. Leslie Scarman, Foreword to ZANDER, supra note 4, at v; see also Jaconelli
11, supm note 4 (discussing issue of airing the United Kingdom's dirty laundry
abroad).
88. Leslie Scarman, Foreword to ZANDER, supra note 4, at v. Lord Scarman
preceded his 1985 call to arms in 1974 when he presented his well-known Wamlyn
Lectures" on a bill of human rights for the United Kingdom. See ZANDER, supra
note 4, at 8-10.
89. The Court stated:
This finding in no way puts in question the good faith of the United
Kingdom Government, who have from the outset of the present proceedings demonstrated their desire to abide by their Convention obligations,
firstly by staying the applicant's surrender to the United States authorities in accord with the interim measures indicated by the Convention
institutions and secondly by themselves referring the case to the Court
for a judicial ruling.
Soering Case, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 45 (1989).
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1. Aims of the European Convention on Human Rights
The European Convention's fundamental human rights
aspirations are stated in the Convention's Preamble, which
emphasizes a profound belief in the necessity of maintaining "a
common understanding and observance of the Human Rights
upon which [fundamental freedoms] depend.'*' The Preamble
thus views the Convention as a tool for ensuring "the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal
Declaration.'*'
Acting on such proclamations, both the Commission and
the Court have expounded the Convention's distinctive, preeminent mission of creating a common, European public order.
In Austria v. Italy,92 the Commission reported that the
Convention's purpose was "to establish a common public order
of the free democracies of Europe.'*3 This view was further
developed in the Commission's report in Ireland v. United
Kingd~rn.'~
Professor Sperduti noted in his concurring opinion
that by ratifying the Convention, member states "each accepted
an obligation towards all the others t~gether."'~
That obligation necessarily implicates "the ties of solidarity which the
State Parties intended to create between themselves with a
view to establishing a European public order.'*6 Building upon
the Commission's report, the Court in Ireland v. United Kingdom emphasized the Convention's role in uniting member
states under a single, enforceable catalogue of fundamental
rights."
90.
European Convention, supra note 6, pmbl., 213 U.N.T.S. a t 222.
91.
Id.
1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 112 (Eur. Comm'n on H.R.). Austria v. Italy
92.
is also known as the Pfunders case. See VAN DIJK & VAN HOOF,supra note 29, at
635.
93.
1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 138. As the Commission explained,
it follows that a High Contracting Party, when it refers an alleged breach
of the Convention to the Commission under Article 24, is not to be regarded as exercising a right of action for the purpose of enforcing its own
rights, but rather as bringing before the Commission an alleged violation
of the public order of Europe.
Id. at 140 (emphasis added).
94.
App. No. 5310171, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 516 (Eur. Comm'n. on H.R.
1976).
95.
Id. at 497 (separate opinion regarding interpretation of Article 1 of European Convention), quoted in DRZEMCZEWSRI,
supra note 45, at 25.
Id. (second emphasis added).
96.
97.
25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 4, 90-91 (1978). The Court stated: "Unlike
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The unique Yaw-making" role of-the European Court of
Human Rightsg8 and the binding authority of the Convention
combine to establish a singular means for the realization of the
fundamental human rights aspirations set forth in the
Convention's Preamble across a broad, European context. Besides binding parties named i n its judgments, the European
Court of Human Rights also creates case law that enunciates
human rights standards for all Council of Europe nations.
"Judgments of the . . . Court often have important consequences for the laws and practices of member states which are not
parties to the particular case under review.'*9 The Court's influence is also felt outside the Council of Europe:
[Court decisions] also have strong persuasive authority with
the younger Inter-American Commission and Court of Human
Rights and the U.N.Human Rights Committee.
The twelve member states of the Council of Europe that
also belong to the European Economic Community, or Common Market, have made adherence to the Convention a virtual condition of membership of the European Community . . . .
The European Court of Justice, which sits in Luxembourg,
[also] has regard for the Convention and United States law
when interpreting Community law.loO

2. The "supreme court" function of the European Court of
Human Rights
As interpreter of Convention provisions, the European
Court of Human Rights gives final expression to the
Convention's binding authority. The Court's status and ability
to define and ensure compliance with European Convention
norms is analogous to the role of the U.S. Supreme Court in
American constitutional law. I n March v. Belgi~m,'~'the
European Court likened its authority to the constitutional
courts of specific Council of Europe member states.lo2 The
U.S. Supreme Court, like the European constitutional courts,

international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere
reciprocal engagements between contracting States. It creates over and above a
network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words
of the preamble, benefit from a 'collective enforcement.' " Id. at 90.
98. See supm part 1113.
99. Lester, supra note 85, at 540.
100. Id.
101. 30 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) (1979).
102. Id. at 36-37.
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functions as the final judicial arbiter of constitutional law.lo3
The European Convention places its Court in a nearly identical
posture.
However, one striking practical difference exists between
the two Courts: the respective number of decisions each Court
hears and decides. In its short history the European Court of
Human Rights has decided approximately 151 cases.lo4 In
contrast, between 1985 and 1989 the U.S. Supreme Court currently decided an average of 164 decisions per year.105 This
allows the European Court more time to consider each case. A
second, related difference between the two tribunals is the
scope of their jurisdiction. The European Court's authority of
review extends to less than half the number of jurisdictions
overseen by the Supreme Court.'''
Viewed against the background of U.K. law, these differences suggest two reasons why litigating European Conventionbased human rights before European Convention tribunals is
desirable.''' First, parties seeking redress have access to the
full weight of the Convention process to litigate the merits of
the claim. Meritorious demands, once vindicated, are endorsed
by a demonstrably compelling legal authority. In addition, since
that authority is supreme, its ruling is non-appealable;lo8pri103. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."); see U.S.
CONST.art. 111, $8 1-2.
104. See NEWMAN& WEISSBRODT,
supm note 17, at 465. The authors suggest
the European Court of Human Rights has decided few cases because the vast majority of applications submitted to the Commission (about 96%) fail to meet the
Convention's rigid admissibility requirements. Id. at 464; see European Convention,
supm note 6, arts. 24-27,213 U.N.T.S. at 236-38.However, the Commission's narrow reading of these requirements "has increased state confidence in the Convention over its more than thirty-five year existence." NEWMAN
& WEISSBRODT,
supra
note 17, a t 464. As of January 1, 1989, the European Commission had decided 286
cases, 180 of which it referred to the Court. Id at 464-65.
OFFICE OF
105. See ANNUAL REPORTOF THE DIRECTOROF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
THE UNITEDSTATES COURTS 103 (1990).
106. Jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights includes the 23 Council of Europe member nations. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. The U.S.
Supreme Court has jurisdiction over matters arising within all GRy states, the
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam, in addition
to its federal jurisdiction.
107. Because the United Kingdom has not adopted the European Convention into
its domestic law, individuals seeking to invoke Convention provisions per se must
do so in Strasbourg rather than before a domestic tribunal; hence, engaging the
Convention's judicial machinery is not only desirable but also necessary for cases
in which U.K. law is either defective or silent concerning a given remedy for violations of rights protected by the Convention.
108. In many cases, it may be more efficient for claims to invoke European
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mary recourse to a forum of last resort may present significant
economic advantages for each party to a dispute.log
Second, these cases provide the Court with a prime opportunity to develop the normative standards of the Convention.''' These standards may then be applied with greater
success across the European Community, in accord with the
Convention's stated desire to create unity and establish a
European public order. Benefits to the United Kingdom would
ensue from a more refined standard upon which to base its
domestic human rights policy.
"It is primarily in the Court's judgments that a European
jurisprudence of human rights is being developed."'" But the
system is young and "has compiled its body of jurisprudence
slowly."1* Although Convention tribunals have a compelling
authority and impact, their jurisprudence needs cultivating.

Convention processes rather than engage a domestic tribunal. Cases like Soering,
which compel a definitive explication of Convention provisions, will almost certainly
be appealed to the Convention tribunals anyway.
109. But see Andrews, supra note 2, at 487. Andrews characterizes the process
as "expensive, complicated, and protracted." Id. Because Article 26 requires that all
local remedies be exhausted before the European Commission may consider a given
claim, European Convention, supra note 6, art. 26, 213 U.N.T.S. at 213, Andrews
suggests that "[i]ncorporation [of the European Convention into domestic United
Kingdom law] may be the most efficient and effective approach to protection of
human rights in the long run." Andrews, supra note 2, at 487. The exhaustion
requirement apparently functions as a check to assure that claims brought before the
Commission are meritorious, and also to assure that a given member state has had
an opportunity to comply with its duties under the Convention.
Although the rule is indeed a hurdle, it is far from insurmountable. It would
appear, too, to be less so in the absence of a domestic bill of rights. Ironically, a
fully-developed domestic catalogue of rights would necessarily compel an equally
mature catalogue of corresponding remedies. As a result, the more extensive the
inventory of remedies at home, the fewer opportunities petitioners would possess to
bring claims before the European Convention Tribunals.
At any rate, the economic cost of seeking relief from the European Court is
outweighed by the certain advantages of unifying European human rights law by
restricting recourse to a single, supreme court.
110. Indeed, individual petitions comprise the bulk of this opportunity:
It seems that the right of access of private suitors has been crucial to
bringing the system of European Human Rights Law alive. Between 1953
and 1983, there were only 18 state petitions filed with the Commission,
but there were 10,709 private claims. Of the 100 decisions and judgments
rendered by the European Court of Human Rights from its inaugural
sitting on April 20, 1959 until 1985, 98 were cases where individuals
were the original petitioners.
JANIS& KAY, supm note 85, at 93 (citation omitted).
111. See Andrews, supra note 2, at 473.
112. See NEWMAN
& WEISSBRODT,
supra note 17, at 464.

.
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The Convention's powerful, sublime aims warrant such development. Likewise, the Convention's member states will increasingly gain in understanding of and ability to ensure domestic
liberties as the Convention develops a sophisticated corpus of
case law. In view of these concerns, this comment suggests
that, for now, the United Kingdom should subordinate chiefly
political concerns to the greater and more compelling aim of
establishing a developed, concrete jurisprudence of human
rights on a decidedly European scale.

IV. CONCLUSION
An important, distinctively twentieth-century trend among
European nations has been the move towards enumerating
fundamental human rights. The United Kingdom has been conservative in its embrace of this trend, especially in its approach
towards recent European Community efforts to create a bill of
rights. Underlying the United Kingdom's conservative image in
this area is its refusal t o install its own domestic bill of rights.
Although the United Kingdom has long been bound by the
European Convention on Human Rights, its lack of an entrenched rights bill requires those with Convention-based
claims against the United Kingdom to invoke the processes of
the European Commission and eventually the European Court
of Human Rights. Domestic remedies for human rights violations are scattered and incomplete, but the European Convention enforcement mechanisms have proven successful in protecting human rights within the United Kingdom. The current
position of the United Kingdom is to avoid a hortatory proclamation of rights. Instead, specific rights are developed one at a
time employing the traditional processes of legislation and
common-law interpretation. The European Convention's character as a sui generis, law-making authority corresponds appropriately with such processes.
Ultimately, the long-term task of building a truly viable
European human rights standard will be served by emphasizing the European Convention process: direct recourse to the
European Commission of Human Rights and its companion
European Court of Human Rights. The goal of a d i e d European human rights standard requires a single adjudication
process. Two competing systems--one national, the other
international-are undesirable because only a single system
can provide a definitive interpretation of the European
Convention's human rights norms. With the prospect of a truly
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united Europe, efficiency in adjudicating human rights issues
becomes a more important factor in the analysis of whether the
United Kingdom should adopt a bill of rights.
Assuming that furthering human rights per se within the
Council of Europe nations is the primary goal of any human
rights initiative, factors such as the United Kingdom's "embarrassment" due to adverse rulings from the Court are irrelevant
t o the more compelling, more encompassing goal of effecting
human rights throughout Europe. The relevant consideration is
how the United Kingdom can benefit the entire European human rights process. Adopting a bill of rights could detract from
the overall efficiency of the adjudicative process by interposing
a new set of rights requiring judicial interpretation to achieve
their aims. To both promote European Convention aims and
judicial efficiency through uniformity, this comment suggests
that the United Kingdom continue to maintain its posture
against a domestic bill of rights.
Keith Cope

